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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Plaintiff's Complaint clearly alleges that 
Defendant Hospital has breached both express and implied 
provisions of the written contracts executed by Plaintiff and 
Said Defendant, the lower Court erred in failing entirely to 
deal with allegations relative to the express provisions; and 
Defendant in their respective briefs have further sought to 
perpetuate that error. Also, Plaintiff's allegations regarding 
a continued course of dealing between the parties reinforces the 
Plaintiff's position and requires a reversal of the lower 
Court's dismissal of the First Two Cause$ of Action with 
prejudice without leave to amend or plead over. 
Nor should plaintiff be required to proceed with its Third 
Course of Action while this appeal is pending on the other two 
Causes of Action since the facts are interrelated and should be 
presented to the trier of fact together and not as bifurcated 
issues. 
Neither the statute of frauds nor any riile of integration 
such as the parol evidence rule is a proper bar to the implied 
covenant which justice and equity require be recognized in the 
circumstances here presented. 
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies 
to leases of real property as well as to all other contracts, 
and is an important factor in this case reinforcing the 
correctness of Plaintiff's position. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff St. Benedict's Development Company ("Development 
Company") responds to the briefs of Defendants St. Benedict's 
Hospital ("Hospital") and The Boyer Company ("Boyer") as 
follows. 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION 
DO STATE CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
A. Defendants Continue to Ignore the Express Contractual 
Promises of Defendant Hospital to Plaintiff 
Development Company. 
The briefs of Defendants on appeal continue the pattern 
Defendants have pursued throughout this litigation, of ignoring 
Hospital's express contractual duty to help "obtain and retain 
satisfactory professional tenants in the new office building," 
(Complaint, 11 18) and to "actively assist the partnership in 
acquiring good tenants until such time as the New Office 
Building is completely occupied." (Complaint, 11 19.) Contrary 
to the assertion of Defendant Boyer at page 18 of its brief that 
the Complaint does not allege that the Hospital breached these 
duties, paragraph 32 of the Complaint describes the vacancies 
which remain to be filled. Because the second building which 
Plaintiff Development Company constructed for Hospital has never 
yet been completely occupied, it is plain that any activity by 
or assisting the Hospital to lure tenants from Plaintiff's 
buildings is in breach of the Hospital's express written 
obligation. Pretending it is otherwise, does not make it so. 
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By ignoring this express contractual breach, Defendants 
attempt to create the impression that there is a great chasm 
between the Hospital's duty to cooperate irl helping to keep 
Plaintiff's buildings filled and Defendants' position that 
Defendant Hospital ought to be free to use its unleased property 
for any purpose it sees fit. However, the bridge that links the 
Hospital's duty to Plaintiff to the manner in which the Hospital 
uses its unleased land is not so gossamer as Defendants would 
have it appear. The issue is whether Hospital has the unbridled 
right to break its promise to Plaintiff by depleting, rather 
than augmenting, Plaintiff's stock of tenahts, not what the 
Hospital might in theory be able to do with tither land it owns 
in the absence of any contractual obligation tp Plaintiff. 
Where use of that other land has the inevitable 
consequence of interfering with Plaintiff's contractual rights, 
that binding link cannot be ignored. Given the circumstances 
created by the contractual dealings of Plaintiff and Defendant 
Hospital, namely the construction of two adjoining office 
buildings, uniquely and exclusively suited to the sole function 
of providing office space for physicians with privileges at 
Defendant Hospital, Hospital should not be allowed to suck the 
only source of life from these dependent appendages with 
impunity. 
It is the strength of the tie that unites these office 
appendages to the body of the Hospital proper which requires and 
justifies the implied covenant on the part? of Hospital to 
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refrain from using its other resources to injure the otherwise 
defenseless interests of Plaintiff Development Company, Were 
Plaintiff's buildings free of the stranglehold of the tenancy 
restrictions imposed by Hospital, in a setting and a location 
better adapted to alternative uses, Defendants' arguments would 
carry more weight. However, because the constraints on the use 
of Plaintiff's premises are themselves integral express 
provisions of the contracts that inseparably tie Plaintiff's 
health to the nourishment of the Hospital, it is only fair to 
recognize the implied bounds these set on conduct of the 
Hospital and those assisting it. 
In short, the relationship fostered and created by the 
Hospital is such that it requires no straining to read into that 
relationship the fulfillment of the conditions for implying 
lease restrictions as set forth in Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. 
Girsh, 227 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1951), cited by Defendant Boyer at pp. 
13-14 of its brief. To repeat, those conditions were set forth 
as follows: 
(1) The implication must arise from the language used or 
it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention 
of the parties; 
(2) It must appear from the language used that it was so 
clearly within the contemplation of the.parties that 
they deemed it unnecessary to express it; 
(3) Implied covenants can only be justified on the 
grounds of legal necessity; 
(4) A promise can be implied only where it can be 
rightfully assumed that it would have been made if 
attention had been called to it; 
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(5) There can be no implied covenant wl^ ere the subject is 
completely covered by the contract. 
227 P.2d at 3-4. 
All of these requirements are met in the present case. 
The implied restriction on how the Hospital uses its other 
property is necessary to effectuate the intent of the leases. 
This implied restriction does appear to be sufficiently within 
the contemplation of the parties that it was not deemed 
necessary to expressly refer to it. There is adequate legal 
necessity to imply such a restriction, since to act otherwise 
results in a failure of consideration for the leases. The 
implied promise can rightfully be assumed to be one that would 
nave been made had attention been called to it, especially since 
the Hospital required in the beginning that Plaintiff stand 
ready to construct a second building when requested by Hospital. 
Finally, the scope of the written contracts between Development 
Company and Hospital are not so complete and entire that they 
preclude such an implied promise. 
Moreover, Plaintiff should be entitled to amend its 
Complaint to allege further facts regarding the Defendant 
Hospital's attempts to acquire Plaintiff's Professional building 
in the recent past which may explain its actions in dealing with 
Defendant Boyer to construct another building that will 
obviously reduce the market value of Plaintiff's building. This 
is an important element of the entire schemfe Plaintiff would 
like to flush out through further discovery. In their developed 
form, these facts will show this case is indeed similar to 
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Carter v. Adlery 291 P.2d 111 (Cal. App. 1955), as described at 
pp. 15-16 of Boyer's brief• The same result should apply, and 
this Court should rule against the landlord Hospital. 
B
- Plaintiff's Claim does not Violate the Statute of 
Frauds. 
Defendants assert that because the contracts between 
Plaintiff and Hospital pertain to leases with a duration of more 
than one year, the language of Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) precludes the relief sought by Plaintiff. All 
that statute requires is that "the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, . . . .ff ^ Id. This is no 
bar because the leases between Plaintiff and Defendant Hospital 
are clearly in writing, and subscribed by Defendant Hospital. 
Cf. Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1974) where the 
Court held there was sufficient memorandum of agreement to meet 
the requirements of the statute of frauds, although 
correspondence of parties did not precisely describe the mining 
claim and every term of agreement. 
C. The Parol Evidence Rule is no Bar to the Implied 
Covenant. 
In a case where the Utah Supreme Court has found a 
contract to be silent on a particular matter, after first 
looking to the four corners of the instrument, the Court found 
it was proper to consider parol evidence, quoting with approval 
the following statement from 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1043: 
The doctrine of partial integration is that where a 
written contract is obviously not, or is shown not 
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to be, the complete contract, parol evidence not 
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show 
what the entire contract really was, by 
supplementing, as distinguished from contradicting, 
the writing. In such a case, parol evidence to 
prove the part not reduced to writing is admissible, 
although it is not admissible as to the part reduced 
to writing, 
Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 
1205 (Utah 1983) . 
In a slightly different setting, a settlement agreement 
was reduced to writing and was found to be silpnt on plaintiff's 
obligation in return for the consideration promised by the 
defendant. Cobb v. Willis, 752 P.2d 106 (Haw. App. 1988). The 
Court found that the intended return consideration was a 
dismissal of two pending suits, and at page 111, stated as 
follows: 
The law will impose an obligation on one party to an 
agreement when, on the basis of all the provisions 
of the contract as a whole, the obligation was 
within the parties1 contemplation or is necessary to 
effectuate the parties1 intentions. 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts § 255 (1964); . . . [other citation 
omitted]. 
Cf. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P. 2d 466 (Utah 
App. 1989) (Court supplied an implied-in-law term concerning 
duration of indemnity agreement where the contract was silent). 
In the present case, this Court should find that the 
implied covenant sought to be enforced by Plaintiff is necessary 
to accomplish the intent of the parties to the leases, as 
ascertained from a consideration of all of the provisions of the 
leases, and is not barred by any rule of integration. 
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D. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
is an Important Factor to be Considered in Real 
Estate Contracts, 
Defendant Hospital has suggested that it is aware of no 
Utah cases finding a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
the lease of real property. (Hospital's brief at 15-16.) This 
statement overlooks a case cited by all parties. Leigh Furniture 
and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). At page 
311 of that reported Opinion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
Leigh Furniture "breached its implied duty to exercise all of 
its rights under the contract reasonably and in good faith." 
That was a case where this factor was important to the holding 
that the landlord improperly attempted to terminate a lease of 
real estate. Later, in Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 
706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court again 
found that an implied covenant of good faith forbidding 
arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages another to be 
critical to its holding that a contract for the lease of real 
estate was enforceable* 
Accordingly, this Court should allow Plaintiff to pursue 
its claim and present evidence on this point by vacating the 
Order of the trial court and remanding this case for further 
proceedings. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
Defendants1 claim that the tort of interference with 
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prospective economic relations has not been $tated because the 
Complaint supposedly lacks allegations pertaining to improper 
purpose or improper means. However, Defendants ignore the 
teaching of Leigh Furniture that (1) a deliberate breach of 
contract/ combined with (2) an immediate purpose to inflict 
injury, which purpose does not of itself predominate over a 
legitimate economic end, may together suffice to satisfy the 
improper means test. 657 P.2d at 309. The rationale for this 
holding is that "contract damages provide an insufficient remedy 
for a breach prompted by an immediate purpose to injure, and 
that purpose does not enjoy the same legal immunity in the 
context of contract relations as it does in the competitive 
marketplace." Id. 
In the present case, Plaintiff believes it has stated 
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and expects to 
enlarge on the evidence supporting its claims, particularly in 
the area of Defendant Hospital's motivation in attempting to 
impair the economic viability of Plaintiff's Professional 
building. Since the building is situated on Defendant 
Hospital's property it is totally dependant on the Hospital's 
staff of doctors for its tenants. Defendant Hospital also has 
the first right of refusal to purchase the building, thereby 
giving it a strong motive to engage in conduct^  which will cause 
Plaintiff to sell the building at a substantially reduced price. 
Defendants also argue that under the lower Court's ruling 
Plaintiff could, if it chose, have repleaded its Third Cause of 
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Action. To have done so would have resulted in a bifurcation of 
the case. Plaintiff is entitled to present all of its claims 
arising from the same transaction or series of transactions in 
the same case, particularly where the facts are interrelated and 
mutually support the several counts of the Complaint. It would 
constitute manifest injustice to require Plaintiff to proceed on 
its Third Cause of Action at the trial level while the issue of 
the sufficiency of the facts to support the first two Causes of 
Action is pending in this Court. To do otherwise certainly 
would create a duplication of time and effort and a waste of 
judicial economy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Complaint properly allfeged claims for 
injunctive relief and damages arising out of breach of contract 
in the first two causes of action of the Complaint. Similarly, 
Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for prospective 
interference with economic relations. Alternatively, Plaintiff 
should be given further leave to amend to reinforce and/or 
further state any such cause of action. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Order dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint should be reversed; and this case should 
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's 
decision, in keeping with the spirit of Rule 15(a) U.R.Civ.P. 
relating to amendments to the pleadings. 
DATED this ?»(? day of March, 1990. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
AitfThur H. Nielsen Q 
John K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & 
Tower 
60 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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